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INDIAN LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Treaties made between the United States and Indian tribes 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries often provided 
that the tribes would retain the right to hunt and fish on the 
lands set aside as Indian reservations or in other designated 
areas "so long as game may be found .... "1 Executive Orders 
or other documents which created or defined reservations often 
specified that the land was to be used for "Indian purposes. "2 
The term "Indian purposes" has been judicially interpreted to 
include the guaranteed tribal right to hunt and fish on the 
indicated lands, free of state or federal control.3 
However, the simple and explicit guarantees of the early 
treaties and Executive Orders have become confounded by the 
complexities of the twentieth century, and confused by social 
and political change. Congress, with its guardian-like powers 
over Indian tribes, 4 has vacillated between a policy of forced 
assimilation of Native Americans into the larger society, and 
efforts to preserve and protect Indian rights and cultural heritage.5 
1. Treaty with the Crow Indians of 1868, 15 Stat. 649, 650 (1868). For discussion of 
Indian treaty terminology and interpretation, see Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review 
of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Upon The Earth"- How 
Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975). 
2. See Exec. Order of January 9, 1884, establishing the Fort Yuma Indian Reserva-
tion "to be used for Indian purposes ... ," reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AF-
FAIRS-LAWS AND TREATIES 832 (1903). 
3. See United States v. Sturgeon, 27 F. Cas. 1357 (D. Nev. 1879). Similar terminol-
ogy such as "to be held as Indian lands are held" has also been interpreted to include the 
right to fish and hunt in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405-
06 (1968). 
4. For a detailed review of federal guardianship theory, see Carter, Race and Power 
Politics As Aspects of Federal Guardianship Over American Indians: Land Related 
Cases, 1887-1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 197 (1976). 
5. For an overview of the history of federal Indian policy, see Washburn, The Histor-
ical Context of American Indian Legal Problems, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 12 (1976). The 
often contradictory federal policies have been conveniently related to time periods in D. 
GETCHES, D. RoSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (1979) (hereinafter FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW). The authors delineate the periods of: treaty making, 1776-1871; allotment 
and assimilation, 1871-1928; Indian reorganization, 1928-1945; tribal termination, 1945-
1961; and Indian self-determination, 1961-present. Id. 
The policy of allotment and assimilation was reflected by the General Allotment Act, 
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1976) (commonly referred to as the Dawes Act of 1887) which 
divided Indian held lands on a per capita basis among tribe members, with individual 
1
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The often contradictory actions of Congress have resulted in 
a maze of federal, tribal and state jurisdiction over Indian 
matters.S Where federal or state actions limit or affect the 
exercise of Indian tribal rights, some tribes have responded by 
asserting their explicit or implied treaty rights or other 
guarantees. The courts are required to interpret the original 
treaties and agreements in conjunction with subsequent con-
gressional enactments. Applying traditional canons of federal 
Indian law, the courts attempt to equitably balance guaranteed 
tribal rights and conflicting state or federal interests. Indian tribal 
hunting and fishing rights are primary areas of this conflict.7 
States have rarely contested the rights of the Indians 
themselves to hunt and fish on their reservations, free of 
regulation.8 But this question has arisen when an Indian 
Indians receiving a parcel of not more than 160 acres. The purpose of the policy was to 
a88imilate Native Americans into the general society. To this end, the parcels assigned to 
individual Indians were to be held in trust by the United States for a period of 25 years, 
• after which the Indian owners could sell the land to non-Indians if they chose. As a fur-
ther inducement to enter the major society, Indians who assumed "the habits of civilized 
life" received United States citizenship. See History of the Allotment Policy, Hearings on 
H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 428· 
89 (1934) (statement of D. S. Otis) reprinted in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra, at 69. 
The Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 
(1974), ended the allotment policy, prohibited alienation of Indian land except among 
the tribes themselves and established a procedure for tribes to organize and adopt consti-
tutions and by-laws, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior. See Comment, 
Tribal Self-Gouernment and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REv. 955 
(1972). This reversal of the allotment and assimilation policy was itself reversed by the 
subsequent federal termination policy. See 'the Concurrent Resolution Expressing the 
Sense of Congress that Certain Tribes of Indians Should be Freed from Federal Supervi-
sion, H,R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess, (1953), amended, H.R. 1063, 83d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1953). H.R. 1063 was better known as Public Law 280, which expressly sought to 
remove all federal supervision and control from effected Indian tribes. See Herzberg, The 
Menominee Indians: Terminotion to Restoration, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 143 (1978). The 
termination policy indicated Congress' return to a philosophy of assimilation of Indians 
"into the mass of the population." See COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, INDIAN AFFAIRS: A REpORT TO CONGRESS (1949), quoted in 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra, at 86. In turn, the termination policy was replaced by the 
federal self-determination policy, reflected by a "significant movement" by the federal 
government toward "increased protection of Indian rights .... " Israel, The 
Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its Impact on Reseruation Resource Deuelop-
ment, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 617, 624 (1976). 
6. For a review of the complicated nature of jurisdiction on reservations, see 
Vollmann, Criminol Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Souereignty and Defendants' 
Rights in Conflict, 22 KAN. L. REv. 387 (1974). 
7. W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND-WHITE MAN'S LAw 196 (1971). 
8. When the issue has been contested, courts have generally held that the states 
2
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reservation was terminated by Congress,8 and former Indian land 
sold to non-Indians. At issue was whether treaty hunting and 
fishing rights were tied to the land and therefore extinguished by 
the transfer of the land from exclusive Indian control, or whether 
those rights were independent and survived alienation of the 
land. 10 Issues have also arisen as to who may exercise hunting 
and fishing rights,lI and whether the rights extended to the 
descendants of Indians who elected to terminate their tribal 
membership and claims to tribal rights in return for monetary 
settlements. 12 
The recognition that wildlife is a valuable and exhaustible 
resource has resulted in competition between state and tribal· 
governments for the economic benefits derived from fishing and 
hunting activities. As Indian tribes seek to develop and 
encourage non-Indian use of on-reservation wildlife resources to 
augment tribal income, states have attempted to impose 
licensing requirements and to apply their fish and game 
regulations to the non-Indian on-reservation activities. Conflict 
has also arisen when the tribes and the states have differing 
concepts of conservation and of the most effective methods of 
preventing over-exploitation of the resource. Finally, con-
troversies have arisen concerning the extent to which the tribes 
and the states may regulate these non-Indian, on-reservation 
activities. 
Various aspects of Indian hunting and fishing rights were 
brought before the Ninth Circuit in five cases in the last term. In 
three of these cases,13 the court applied basic canons of federal 
have no regulatory power over Indian on-reservation fishing. E.g., Moore v. United 
States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 827 (1946); Pioneer Packing Co. v. 
Winslow, 159 Wash. 655, 294 P. 557 (1930); Arnett v. Five GiJI Nets, 48 Cal. App. 3d 454, 
i21 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976). But see Puyallup Tribe, Inc. 
v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768 (9th 
. Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979) (under strict standards, states may regulate In-
dian on-reservation fishing for conservation purposes). 
9. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1974) (Kimball 1); see notes 76-
80 infra and accompanying text. 
10. [d. 
11. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kimballl1); see notes 
81-108 infra and accompanying text. 
12. [d. at 775-76. 
13. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. Jan., 1979) (per Jameson, D.J., sit-
ting by designation; the other panel members were Goodwin and Anderson JJ.), cert. 
denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979); California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153 (9th 
3
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Indian law to the questions presented and generally supported 
the contentions of the Indian parties. In the other two cases, one 
marked by a dissent, the court emphasized the federal 
instrumentality theory. 14 The court held, in one case, that a state 
may regulate non-Indian, on-reservation hunting and fishing 
activities unless clearly and expressly preempted by Congress or 
the tribe}S 
While the cases are significant in their own right, and have 
economic as well as cultural importance for the Indian litigants, 
the court's interpretation and application of traditional 
principles of federal Indian law in resolving the hunting and 
fishing rights issues may be of even greater significance to other 
areas of Indian law. This article will review the cases considered 
by the court and examine the Ninth Circuit's findings on the 
issues of tribal sovereignty, federal preemption and tribal 
immunity from suit. 
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
European colonists early recognized Indian property rights 
and made token affirmation of their validity to simplify the 
Cir. Apr., 1979) (per Anderson, J.; the other panel members were Takasugi, D.J., and 
Carter, J.); United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. July, 1979) (per Wright, J.; 
the other panel members were Tang, J., and Palmieri, D.J.). 
14. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. Sept., 1979) (per Sneed, J.; 
the other panel members were Anderson, J., and Williams, D.J.) petition for cert. filed, 
48 U.S.L.W. 3572 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1980) (No. 79-1128); Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Choy, 
J.; Duniway, J., dissenting; the other panel member was Grant, D.J.). The term "fed-
eral instrumentality" refers to an agency or property of the federal government which is im-
mune from state control or taxation due to its purpose as an instrument of federal policy. 
Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78, 20 A.2d 455, 458 (1941). "Federal pre-
emption" doctrine prevents state regulation or involvement in areas in which the federal 
government has indicated the intent to exclude state action, or where dual regulation would 
hamper or obstruct federal policy. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell, 303 
U.S. 177 (1938). As applied to Indian tribes, federal instrumentality theory has shielded 
tribal on-reservation enterprises from state regulation, and similarly, prevented state 
taxation of salaries earned on a reservation by individual Indians. McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). In Confederated Tribes, the Ninth Circuit applied 
a hybrid of federal instrumentality theory and federal preemption doctrine, resulting in 
tribal immunity from state regulation only where the tribe or the federal government has 
explicitly and expressly indicated the intent to exclude a state government. Significantly, 
this novel theory removes from a state the burden of proving that state involvement would 
not hamper a federal policy, and requires instead that an Indian tribe show that the state 
action will materially interfere with a policy or goal of the tribe. See Kissel, note 207 infra. 
15. 591 F.2d at 93. 
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occupation of Indian lands. Ie Indian rights are, therefore, among 
the oldest in our system of law and predate the United States 
Constitution. The United States continued to recognize Indian 
rights and to negotiate with the Indian tribes as sovereign 
nations l7 in order to minimize conflict and to provide a means of 
national expansion. 18 
The traditional means employed by the United States to gain 
concessions of land from the Indian tribes was the negotiation of 
treaties, often supported by a military presence. ID Since the power 
to make treaties with Indian tribes is derived from the 
Constitution, treaties are considered the supreme law of the land 
and may not be contravened by state law.20 Although the practice 
of entering into treaties with Indian tribes ended in 1871, treaties 
made prior to that date continue in effect unless superseded by 
subsequent congressional acts. 21 
Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes,22 and may 
therefore enact legislation which contradicts or abrogates a prior 
treaty, but only if that intent is expressly stated in the 
subsequent act.23 The termination of treaty rights requires either 
a clear statement or conclusive legislative history which reflects 
the intent to abrogate the rights. z4 That intent may not be 
merely implied or imputed to Congress.25 
16. Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal Problems, 40 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROD. 12, 14·15 (1976). 
17. Id. at 16. See also W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 210·14 (1975). 
18. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note I, at 608·09. 
19. Id. at 609·10. Cf. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970) (the Court 
notes that treaty negotation was not at arm's length, but "[rlather, treaties were imposed 
upon [the Indiansj and they had no choice but to consent," id. at 630·31.). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides Congress the power "[tjo regulate Com· 
merce ... with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 grants to the 
President the power "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Trea· 
ties .... " See United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876). 
21. The Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976), provided that the 
United States would not form treaties with the Indian tribes after 1871, but no existing 
treaties would be affected or invalidated by the Act. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 
U.S. 194, 201·02 (1975). 
22. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 
553, 565·66 (1903). 
23. E.g., United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446 (1924); United States v. White, 508 
F.2d 453, 456·57 (8th Cir. 1974). 
24. For a detailed analysis of the difference between clear or expreas statement and 
conclusive legislative history as bases for treaty right abrogation, see Wilkinson & 
Volkman, supra note I, at 645·61. 
25. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412·13 (1968). 
5
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Traditionally, Indian treaties reserved certain lands for the 
exclusive use of the Indian tribes, and provided for the payment 
of cash and services to the tribes. In return, the tribes ceded to 
the United" States other lands claimed by the Indians. Indian 
rights of hunting and fishing, have been considered exclusive for 
the tribes on retained reservation land. However, on the ceded 
land, these rights became non-exclusive28 and are referred to as 
off-reservation rights. 
The evolution of federal Indian law has resulted in the 
formulation of basic rules of treaty construction. Central to 
treaty interpretation is the theory of reserved rights, which holds 
that the powers of Indian tribes are not granted by Congress, but 
derive from tribal sovereignty based on the original possession of 
the land.27 Treaties are therefore "not a grant of rights to the 
Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those 
not granted."28 
In addition, courts require that ambiguous prOVISIOns of 
treaties be construed as the Indian signatories would have 
understood them.2V The principle that treaties are to be 
interpreted liberally in favor of Indian tribes has not been 
consistently applied.30 Nevertheless, many courts follow the 
"express statement rule," requiring, for effective abrogation, a 
subsequent Congressional act that explicitly abrogates treaty 
rights.31 
The jurisdictional conflict arising from claims of federal and 
state governments and Indian tribes over on-reservation matters 
results from three contradictory theories. First, tribes claim the 
right of self-government based on the argument that at the time 
26. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 399 (1968) (Puyallup 
I). Non-exclusive means that a right which formerly included the power to exclude non-
tribe members from participation has been transformed to a right which is shared in 
common with non-tribe members. 
27. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
28. [d. at 381. 
29. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Choctaw Nation v. 
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 
406 (1968); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Jones v. Meehan, 175 
U.S. 1 (1899); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 5t)1-53 (1832). 
30. E.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Tulee v. 
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 
104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939). 
31. E.g., United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 456-57 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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of the early treaties, tribes were considered sovereign nations.32 
Although . some rights were relinquished by treaty, or were 
abrogated by Congress, those not expressly terminated continued 
as reserved rights and support tribal sovereignty and on-
reservation self-government.33 Second, federal claims to on-
reservation jurisdiction derive from the United States 
Constitution34 and from the judicially created theory that the 
federal government has assumed a guardian relationship in which 
the Indian tribes are viewed as wards requiring protection.35 
Finally, state claims to on-reservation jurisdiction reflect the 
doctrine that states possess original and complete sovereignty over 
their territory, except as limited by the Constitution or by 
conditions expressly imposed at the time of entry to the Union.3s 
State claims are federally preempted in many areas. They may 
also be superceded by the principles that treaties are the supreme 
law of the land, and that Indian tribes possess a unique 
sovereignty somewhat similar to that of the United States.37 Even 
when inherent on-reservation state jurisdiction is absent, 
however, Congress may delegate it to the states, as they did in 
Public Law 280,38 which transferred federal jurisdiction to certain 
states39 for civil and criminal matters arising on reservations. 
32. E.g., K. KICKINGBIRD, L. KICKINGBIRD, C. CHIBI'M'Y & C. BERKEY, INDIAN SOVER· 
ElGNTY 6 (1977). This is a workbook of Indian law, developed by the Institute for the 
Development of Indian Law, Washington, D.C. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
(6 Pet.) 515, 532, 559 (1832). 
33. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at xviii-xix. 
34. The commerce clause provides Congress with the power to "regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. The commerce clause is usually combined with the 
supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2, to support federal on-reservation juris-
diction. The courts have refused to consider whether this jurisdictional claim is valid, 
stating that it is a "political question" left to the discretion of Congre88. See United 
States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865). 
35. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). See also Carter, supra note 4. 
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 and amend.X. 
37. This sovereignty, which includes immunity from suit, is possessed only by tribes, 
not by individual Indians. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978); 
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1977) (Puyallup III); 
California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1979). 
38. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified as amended in various 
sections of 18, 25 and 28 U.S.C.). See Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State 
Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535 (1975). 
39. Originally Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin were 
granted civil and criminal jurisdiction, with some limitations. Jurisdiction could be as-
sumed by other states without the requirement of Indian consent. In 1968, Congress en-
acted a provision requiring consent from effected Indians prior to the assumption of juris-
diction under Public Law 280. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (Supp. 1976). 
7
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arising on reservations. 
In considering on-reservation jurisdiction, all former 
reservation land, even if sold to non-Indians, remains legally 
defined as "Indian Country"40 unless expressly severed by 
Congress}' The intent of Congress to sever former reservation 
land must be explicitly stated on the face of the act permitting 
alienation from Indian possession, or be clear from the 
surrounding circumstances and the legislative history.42 
In reviewing the hunting and fishing rights cases before it 
this term, the Ninth Circuit has produced inconsistent results. 
In some cases, the court considered some of the principles of 
federal Indian law, applying and extending them; in other cases, 
however, the court used an interpretation of federal 
instrumentality doctrine which defines Indian tribes as a mere 
arm of the federal government.43 The Ninth Circuit's use of 
instrumentality doctrine has been described both as "a 
substantial threat to tribal sovereignty, "44 and as an effective 
negation of the "independent tribal authority to self-govern."45 
This view is borne out by the court's holding. 
III. KIMBALL V. CALLAHAN: THE EFFECT OF TRIBAL 
TERMINATION ON TREATY RIGHTS 
In Kimball v. Callahan48 (Kimball In, the court reviewed 
the effect of tribal termination on tribal and individual treaty 
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976) defines Indian Country as: 
(a) al\ land within the limits of any Indian reservation under 
the jurisdiction of the United States government, notwith-
standing the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation, (b) 81\ dependent Indian 
communities within the borders of the United States whether 
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, 
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all 
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been ex-
tinguished, including rights-of-ways running through the same. 
41. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 (1973). ~ 
42. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 
412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973). 
43. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 
591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979). 
44. Kissel, The Ninth Circuit's Federal Instrumentality Doctrine-A Threat to Tri-
bal Sovereignty, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 358, 384 (1978). 
45. Id. at 358. 
46. 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979). 
8
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rights. The court affirmed the findings entered in a previous case 
by the same name,47 and extended the holding to the descendants 
of tribe members who had terminated their tribal affiliation. A 
review of the history of the Klamath Reservation and of the 
legislative and judicial background which shaped the issues 
considered by the Ninth Circuit last term will be helpful for a 
clearer understanding of Kimball II. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1864, members of the Klamath and Modoc Indian Tribes 
and of the Yahuskin Band of Snake Indians48 signed a treaty 
with representatives of the United States.49 In return for cash 
payments and services from the federal government, 50 the Indian 
signatories ceded tribal land claims in southern Oregon and 
northern California to the United States. The treaty provided 
that certain land "within the country ceded by this treaty, shall, 
until otherwise directed by the President of the United States, 
be set apart as a residence for said Indians, [and be] held and 
regarded as an Indian Reservation . . . . "51 A provision of the 
treaty guaranteed the Indians "the exclusive right of taking fish 
in the streams and lakes included in said reservation.'-'52 No 
mention was made in the treaty of hunting or trapping rights. 53 
47. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974) (Kimball!). 
48. The Klamath and Modoc Tribes were related and originally referred to them-
selves as Maklaks. After the division of the Tribes, the Klamaths referred to themselves 
as Eukskni, and the Modocs apparently assumed their present name. The various bands 
referred to as the Yahuskin Snake group were also known as Paiutes, Shoshones or by the 
band names Yahuskin and Walpapi. 
49. The 1864 treaty, referred to as the Council Grove Treaty of October 14, 1864, 16 
Stat. 707 (1869), was actually the second treaty negotiated with the Klamath and Modoc 
Tribes. On February 14, 1864, the Tribes entered into a treaty by which they agreed to 
live in peace, subject themselves to the jursidiction of the United States, and permit 
travel by non-Indians through their land. In return the Tribes received two blankets and 
some food, and similar rights to travel through the non-Indian settlements if unarmed. 
The first treaty, which ceded no land, was rejected by the federal Indian Bureau as im-
proper and void. The subsequent Council Grove Treaty resulted in the cession by the 
Tribes of approximately "twelve to fourteen million" acres of land claimed by the Indi-
ans, and was ratified by Congress in 1869. R. Du..LON, BURNT-OUT FIRES 20 (1973). The 
treaty was objected to by some members of the Modoc Tribe, and resulted in the so-
called Modoc War in 1873. For an historical perspective of the treaty negotiations, see id. 
50. For a statement of the payments and services to be provided the Tribes, see 
Treaty of Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707 (1869); R. DILLON, supra note 49, at 62; Pearson, 
Hunting Rights: Retention of Treaty Rights After Termination-Kimball v. Callahan, 4 
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 121, 122 (1976). 
51. Treaty of Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707, 708 (1869). 
52. [d. 
53. [d. 
9
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In creating the reservation, Congress assumed civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over matters arising within reservation 
boundaries.54 In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280,55 which 
transferred this jurisdiction to Oregon, and represented the 
initiation of the federal termination policy.58 Public Law 280 
expressly exempted treaty fishing, hunting and trapping from 
state regulation.57 To implement the termination policy, 
Congress passed the 1954 Klamath Termination ActaS which 
established a tribal membership roll closed to additions after 
August, 1954.58 This Act provided for termination of the 
reservation and sale of former reservation lands to both Indians 
and non-indians, to be final in 1961.80 Tribe members could 
withdraw from the tribe and receive a monetary share of tribal 
holdings, or receive a parcel of the former reservation land and 
participate in an Indian-developed corporation intended to 
oversee the land remaining in Indian possession. Similar to the 
exemption prOVISIon of Public Law 280, the Klamath 
Termination Act provided that nothing in the Act would 
"abrogate any fishing rights or privileges of the tribe or the 
members thereof enjoyed under Federal treaty."81 Unlike Public 
Law 280, however, the Klamath Termination Act included no 
statement concerning hunting or trapping rights. 
The federal termination policy, and the combined effect of 
Public Law 280 and the Klamath Termination Act resulted in 
54. The federal assumption of on-reservation jurisdiction included in the Treaty of 
Oct. 14, 1864 was based on the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2. See note 
34 supra. 
55. See notes 38-40 supra. 
56. See note 5 supra. 
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1976). 
58. Act of August 13, 1954, ch. 732 § I, 68 Stat. 718 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-
564x (1976)). 
59. 25 U.S.C. § 564(b) (1976) states: 
At midnight of August 13, 1954, the roll of the tribe shall be 
closed and no child born thereafter shall be eligible for enroll-
ment: Provided, That the tribe shaH have a period of six 
months from August 13, 1954, in which to prepare and submit 
to the Secretary a proposed roll of the members of the tribe 
living on August 13, 1954, [the date of this Act] which shall be 
published in the Federal Register. 
00. 25 U.S.C. § 564a(d) (1976) states: " 'Tribal property' means any real or personal 
property, including water rights, or any interest in real or personal property, that belongs 
to the tribe and either is held by the United States in trust for the tribe or is subject to a 
restriction against alienation imposed by the Unites States." 
61. 25 U.S.C. § 564m(b) (1976). 
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litigation requmng nearly twenty-five years of treaty and 
statutory analysis by federal courts. These cases reflect an 
inconsistent application of federal Indian law principles, and 
included disapproval of a prior Ninth Circuit decision which the 
appellate court noted "could not stand"62 in light of a United 
States Supreme Court case63 which involved similar issues and 
affirmed traditional Indian law principles. 
The cases preceding Kimball II64 began in 1956, after the 
enactment of the Klamath Termination Act, but prior to the 
final termination of the Klamath Reservation in 1961. In 
Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. Maison (Klamath 1),65 the tribes 
brought suit to enjoin Oregon from enforcing its game laws 
against tribe members hunting and trapping on the reservation. 
Applying the principle that Indian treaties must be interpreted 
as the Indian signatories would have understood them, the 
district court found that the guarantee of fishing rights in the 
Klamath Treaty impliedly included hunting and trapping 
rights." These implied treaty rights were included in the express 
exemption from state regulation contained in Public Law 280. 
Therefore, Oregon was precluded from extending its game law 
enforcement to Indian on-reservation hunting and trapping,61 
In 1964, three years after termination of the Klamath 
Reservation, tribe members who had elected to maintain tribal 
affiliation, contested Oregon's contention that the hunting, 
trapping and fishing rights established in Klamath 1 were 
extinguished by the termination of the reservation. In Klamath 
and Modoc Tribes v. Maison (Klamath II), the Ninth Circuit 
failed to apply the federal Indian law principle that treaty rights 
may be abrogated only by an express indication of Congress' 
intent to do SO.68 The appellate court found that treaty rights 
were tied to the existence of the reservation, and were 
62. 493 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1974), referring to Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Mai-
son, 338 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1964), which held that treaty rights of the Tribes on the 
reservation were extinguished on all land transferred from Indian control to federal or 
private ownership as a result of the Klamath Termination Act. 338 F.2d at 623. 
63. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). See notes 77 to 79 infra 
and accompanying text. 
64. 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979). 
65. 139 F. Supp. 634 (D. Or. 1956). 
66. [d. at 637. 
67. [d. at 636-37. 
68. 338 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1964); see note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
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extinguished unless expressly extended by the Klamath 
Termination Act, thereby permitting Oregon to apply state fish 
and game regulations to tribe members hunting or fishing on 
former reservation lands. 
Four years later, in Menominee Tribe v. United States,69 the 
Supreme Court considered the effect of the 1954 termination of 
the Menominee Tribe and reservation by Congress, rejecting the 
Klamath II reasoning. The Court found that the language of the 
Treaty of Wolf River of 1854,70 setting aside the Wolf River 
reservation "for a home" for the Menominee Tribe, "to be held 
as Indian lands are held"71 implied the tribal right to hunt and 
fish even if not specifically stated. The Supreme Court applied 
the Winans72 doctrine which established that a treaty be 
construed as "the Indians . . . understood it, and as justice and 
reason demand . . . . "73 The Court, observing that "the 
intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly 
imputed to Congress,"74 found that the fishing and hunting 
rights of the Menominee Tribe had not been extinghished by the 
Menominee Termination Act.7G The findings in Menominee had 
a signficant impact on the Ninth Circuit six years later when the 
effect of tribal and reservation termination were again brought 
before the appellate court in Kimball [. 
The plaintiffs in Kimball [were Klamath Reservation Indians 
whose ancestors, or who themselves had elected to withdraw from 
the tribe, pursuant to the Klamath Termination Act. Their 
interest in tribal property had been converted to money and paid 
to them, and thus had been transferred to the United States or 
private ownership. Even so, the plaintiffs maintained Othat their 
individual treaty rights to fish, hunt and trap on the former 
reservation lands, free of state regulation, survived termination 
and withdrawal from the tribe. The Indians sought a declaration 
of their rights and an injunction to prevent Oregon from enforcing 
its game laws against tribe members on former reservation lands. 
69. 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
70. Treaty of Wolf River, 1854, 10 Stat. 1064, 1065, art. 2 (1854). 
71. 391 U.S. at 406 (1968). 
72. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see text accompanying note 27 
supra. 
73. 198 U.S. at 380. 
74. 391 U.S. at 413, quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934). 
75. [d. at 412-13. 
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After the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted,78 the plaintiffs 
appealed. The Ninth Circuit noted that its finding in Klamath 
11,77 that treaty rights tied to the reservation did not survive 
termination, could not stand subsequent to Menominee u. 
United States. The Kimball I court held that Klamath 
Reservation Indians who withdrew from the tribe and received a 
monetary share of tribal holdings nevertheless retained treaty 
rights to hunt and fish on former reservation lands free of state 
regulation.78 The court, compelled by Menominee to find for the 
Indian plaintiffs, stated that the Termination Act could not be 
construed as "a backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and 
fishing rights of these Indians."7' The Ninth Circuit then 
remanded the case to the district court for further hearing on the 
issue of state regulation of Indian hunting and fishing on the 
former reservation lands for the purposes of conservation. 
On remand, the district court held that hunting, fishing and 
trapping based on treaty rights were exempt from state 
regulation and that these rights also extended to the descendants 
of all Indians included on the tribal roll at the date of 
termination.80 Oregon appealed, and last term the case again came 
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
B. Kimball u. Callahan (Kimball II) 
Oregon's appeal from the district court decision presented 
the Ninth Circuit the opportunity to review and clarify its 
findings in Kimball!. In Kimball II, the appellate court affirmed 
the district court's findings and considered the additional issue 
of whether the state could regulate Indian fishing and hunting on 
former reservation lands for the purpose of conservation.81 
In its argument, Oregon maintained that the appellate court 
should reconsider the state contentions that: (1) only those 
Indians on the final tribal roll could exercise tribal rights; (2) that 
persons born after the closing of the tribal roll on August 13, 
76. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d at 565. 
77. 338 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1964). 
78. 493 F.2d at 569-70. 
79. [d. at 568, citing Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. at 412. 
SO. Kimball v. Callahan 590 F.2d 768, 770 (9th Cir. 1979). 
81. [d. at 775-77. 
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1954, were not entitled to exercise treaty rights; (3) that treaty 
rights could not be exercised on land disposed of to the federal 
government or to private purchasers; and (4) that the state could 
regulate the exercise of treaty rights to hunt and fish on former 
reservation lands by members of the tribes for conservation 
purposes. The state argued that these issues extended beyond 
those in Kimball I, that the findings in Kimball I were 
inconsistent with subsequent cases82 and that new evidence of 
the legislative history of the Klamath Termination Act would 
dictate a different result. 
In dismissing the state's contentions, the appellate court 
reviewed each case cited by Oregon as inconsistent with Kimball 
I. The court first considered its own holding in United States u. 
Washington83 and a court of claims decision in White/oot u. 
United States,84 and distinguished Kimball I, noting that neither 
Washington nor White/oot dealt with the rights of individual 
Indians after the termination of a tribe. The panel observed that 
the Kimball I decision was not based on retained treaty rights 
flowing from tribal property rights; rather, since the Kimball I 
plaintiffs had elected withdrawal the decision was expressly 
based on individual treaty rights unconnected with land pos-
seSSIOn. 
In further analyzing Washington and White/oot, the court 
discussed individual user rights to the tribal property. Klamath 
Reservation Indians had individual user rights to the tribal 
treaty rights of hunting, fishing, and trapping on their 
reservation prior to the Klamath Termination Act. Kimball I 
found that the Termination Act did not extinguish those tribal 
rights. Consequently, the individual Indians did not suffer the 
82. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup Ill); 
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 
(1976); White foot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 
(1962). 
83. 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). In Washington, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision of Senior District Judge Boldt that 
various treaties guaranteed 14 tribes the opportunity to take "up to 50% of the harvest-
able number of fish that may be taken by all fisherman .... " 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.O. 
Wash. 1974). The so-called "Boldt Decision" and its progeny have caused considerable 
controversy. See note 209 infra and accompanying text. 
84. 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961). In Whitefoot, the court of claims held that the inun-
dation of tribal fishing areas by a dam had been compensated by payment to the tribe, 
and that no separate compensation was owing to individual Indians. Id. at 675. 
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loss of their user rights. Thus, the court concluded that nothing 
in Washington or Whitefoot was contrary to this aspect of 
Kimball 1.85 
The appellate court next turned to the state's argument that 
Kimball I was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup IIIJ.86 The 
Ninth Circuit again distinguished Kimball I, observing that 
unlike the Indians in Puyallup III, the Klamath Reservation 
Indians were not seeking exclusive rights to hunt and fish on the 
former reservation lands. The court held that although the 
transfer or modification of reservation lands may affect treaty 
rights by converting them from exclusive to non-exclusive, the 
non-exclusive rights to fish, hunt and trap on former reservation 
lands were protected by the Klamath Treaty provision87 
guaranteeing the "exclusive right of taking fish."88 That right, 
and the judicially implied rights to hunt and trap survived 
termination, but were rendered non-exclusive by the alienation 
of the land from Indian ownership. 
Having dismissed the argument that Washington, Whitefoot 
and Puyallup III were inconsistent with Kimball I, the court 
considered the state's second major contention: that the 
legislative history not considered by the first Kimball court 
required a contrary result. This legislative history, which the 
Kimball I panel had specifically found lacking, reflected the 
intent of Congress to extinguish the treaty rights to hunt, fish 
and trap on former reservation lands according to Oregon. The 
state presented evidence of the legislative history of the 1958 
amendments89 to the Klamath Termination Act, contending they 
reflected the intent of Congress to terminate treaty rights of 
Indians who elected to withdraw. The Kimball II court found 
nothing in the new material that indicated an intent by Congress 
to abrogate the Klamath Reservation Indians' treaty rights. 90 
Finding nothing in the state's contentions that supported 
85. 590 F.2d at 773. 
86. 433 U.S. 165 (1977). 
87. 590 F.2d at 774. 
88. 493 F .2d at 566. 
89. Act of August 23, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-731, § 1, 72 Stat. 816 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 564w-1 (1976)). 
90. 590 F.2d at 775. 
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reconsideration on issues decided in the first appeal, the court 
concluded that the Kimball I decision that "withdrawn tribal 
members retained their treaty rights to hunt, fish, and trap on 
the lands constituting their ancestral Klamath Indian 
Reservation, including land constituting United States forest 
lands and privately owned land on which hunting, fishing and 
trapping is permitted," was the law of the case.D! Thus, the court 
rejected the state's challenges to Kimball I, and in so doing 
supported and clarified that case. 
The court next considered the extension of treaty rights to 
tribal roll member descendants who were born subsequent to the 
closing of the roll. This question had not arisen in Kimball I. To 
support its contendion that individuals born after the tribal roll 
was closed enjoyed no treaty rights, the state argued that the 
Klamath Termination Act expressly provided that individuals 
born after the 1954 closing date could not subsequently be 
enrolled. The state maintained that an individual must have had 
tribal membership status and been enrolled to share in tribal 
property or rights. Rejecting this argument, the court observed 
that although the Klamath Termination Act was final in 
terminating federal services to the Indians and federal supervision 
of reservations, the Act clearly contemplated the continuing 
existence of tribal organizations. The power of the tribe to act 
under a tribal constitution and by-laws consistent with the 
Termination Act was unaffected.92 
The court noted that the Klamath Tribe maintained a tribal 
government and that the tribal constitution established criteria 
for membership in the tribe. 93 The tribal roll was created only to 
determine who should share in the distribution of tribal property 
disposed of pursuant to the Klamath Termination Act. 
Reasoning that since the tribe retained the power to establish 
membership criteria and to permit eligible individuals to join, 
and since Kimball I decided that the Act did not extinguish 
tribal treaty rights to hunt, trap and fish. the court found these 
rights were bestowed on all descendants of persons on the final 
roll.U The appellate court therefore upheld the district court 
91. [d. 
92. [d. at 776. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. 
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finding that the Termination Act did not limit treaty hunting, 
fishing and trapping rights to persons on the final tribal roll of 
1954, and that those rights were extended to eligible descendents 
of individuals listed on the final roll.95 The Ninth Circuit also 
affirmed the lower court finding that the Termination Act did 
not affect the tribe's authority to regulate the exercise of these 
rights by individual Indians. 
The Kimball II court next turned to the question of state 
regulation of Indian hunting and fishing on former reservation 
lands for the purpose of conservation. The court noted a series of 
cases which established state power to regulate, while not 
prohibiting treaty-protected fishing, in the interest of conser-
vation so long as the regulations met appropriate standards 
and did not discriminate against Indians.96 These cass held 
that a state must demonstrate that both the imposed fishing 
and hunting regulations and their application to Indians 
are reasonable and necessary to conservation.97 Observing that 
the Klamath Indians were not seeking exclusive rights to hunt, 
fish and trap on the former reservation lands, and further that 
the General Council of the Klamath Tribe had adopted a 
comprehensive scheme of joint hunting regulation with the state, 
the court noted the tribe's recognition of state authority to 
reasonably regulate Indian hunting, fishing and trapping for 
conservation purposes. 9S In dispute, however, was the extent of 
the state's authority. 
The Klamaths maintained that the Ninth Circuit should 
decide the appropriate extent of state regulation for conser-
vation, while Oregon argued that the issue should be decided 
by the federal district court. The appellate court ruled that 
the matter should be remanded to the lower court for the 
"development of a factual record which would serve as a basis 
for establishing regulations within the scope of the state's right 
to regulate the Indians' treaty rights. "99 Also, the district court 
95. Id. 
96. Id., citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165,177 (1977) 
(Puyallup III); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. 
Department of Game (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968); United States v. Washing-
ton, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969). 
97. 590 F.2d at 776-77. 
98. Id. at 777. 
99.Id. 
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should formulate standards based on the evidence presented, 
and in keeping with the applicable guidelines of Puyall~p [, 
[[100 and IIpoI. If the parties proved unable to agree upon the 
appropriate scope of the state's authority, the district court was 
to do SO.102 Having established a procedure to resolve future 
disputes between the litigants, the Ninth Circuit remanded the 
case to the district court for implementation. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kimball II reaffirmed and 
extended the court's earlier holding in Kimball [ that Indian 
treaty rights are not dependent on the continued possession of 
reservation lands. This case is of particular significance to tribes 
whose reservations and tribal status were terminated as a result 
of Congress' termination policy. The decision in Kimball II is 
equally important to tribes and individual Indians who are 
permitted by Congress to sell their reservation lands to non-
Indians. This alienation of Indian land to non-Indians, while 
altering hunting, fishing and other treaty rights from exclusive to 
non-exclusive, will no longer be a complete and conclusive 
surrender of these rights. Where the former reservation land is 
transferred to the federal government, or where the private 
purcpaser allows hunting, fishing and trapping of the land, 
the treaty rights may be exercised by Indians, free of state 
regulations except those that are reasonable and necessary for 
conservation purposes. 
Of overriding importance, however, is the Ninth Circuit's 
affirmation of the principle that the intent to abrogate or modify 
Indian treaty rights must be expressly stated, and may not be 
100. See note 96 supra and accompanying text. 
101. 590 F.2d at 768,777, citing Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 
(1977) (Puyallup /II); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup 
/l); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I). The 
Puyallup cases arose in Washington over state efforts to regulate Indian off-reservation 
treaty fishing. In Puyallup [, the first case to permit state regulation of a treaty right, the 
Court affirmed Washington's power to regulate off-reservation treaty fishing for 
conservation purposes. The standard established in Puyallup [was that state regulation of 
Indian treaty fishing had to be "necessary for the conservation of fish .... " 391 U.S. at 
399. The regulation could not discriminate against Indians. [d. at 398. In Puyallup II, a 
state regulation prohibiting the use of gill nets was invalidated because it discriminated 
against Indians. 414 U.S. at 48. In Puyallup III, the power of the state to regulate treaty 
fishing was extended to on-reservation Indian fishing, under the standards previously 
established. 433 U.S. at 175-77. 
102. 590 F.2d 768, 777. 
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lightly imputed to Congress. The earlier Ninth Circuit finding in 
Klamath III03 that treaty rights were, by implication, altered to 
mere statutory grants by the Klamath Termination Act, 
represented what the Supreme Court termed a "backhanded" 
abrogation of treaty rights. 104 In applying the strictest test for 
abrogation of treaty rights, the Ninth Circuit provided a 
significant safeguard to the continued exercise of Indian treaty 
rights. 
Although Kimball II affirmed and extended Kimball I, 
there was a distinct difference in the tenor of the two decisions. 
In Kimbal 1,105 the Ninth Circuit showed a subtle antagonism 
at being "compelled"108 by the Supreme Court decision in 
Menominee. Although the Ninth Circuit panel found that its 
earlier holding in Klamath II could no longer stand following 
Menominee, the appellate court seemed reluctant to adopt the 
Menominee reasoning as its own.I07 In Kimball II this apparent 
reluctance was absent. The court appeared more certain and 
consistent in its application of traditional federal Indian law 
principles. If the Ninth Circuit has adopted the traditional 
canons of treaty and federal Indian law interpretation, future 
court decisions will reflect more consistency and predictability. 
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's application of the federal 
instrumentality theory in Cf!nfederated Tribes of the Colville 
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, lOS indicates that such 
optimism about the Ninth Circuit's adoption of traditional 
standards should be guarded. 
IV. CALIFORNIA V. QUECHAN TRIBE OF INDIANS: 
A TEST OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT 
In a second case regarding tribal hunting and fishing rights, 
California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians,109 the Ninth Circuit 
considered the issues of tribal sovereignty and tribal sovereign 
immunity from suit. The case arose when California sought a 
declaration of the state's right to send state game wardens onto 
103. 338 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1964). 
104. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. at 412. 
105. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974). See also text accompanyingnotes 70-79 supra. 
106. 493 F.2d at 567. 
107. [d. at 568. 
108. 591 F.2d 89 (1979). See text accompanying notes 190-203 infra. 
109. 595 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. Apr., 1979) (per Anderson, J.; the other panel members 
were Carter, J., and Takasugi, D.J.). 
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the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation to enforce state game laws on 
non-Indians hunting and fishing on the reservation with tribal 
permission. IIO The Quechan Tribe challenged the power of the 
state to bring the suit. The appellate court reviewed the prin-
ciple of tribal immunity from suit, and considered whether the 
fact that the suit was brought by a state government negated 
the tribe's immunity. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Quechan Tribe of Indians was organized pursuant to 
the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. 111 The 
tribe resides on the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation located in 
southern California and Arizona, along the Colorado River. The 
reservation land was transferred to the Department of the Inte-
rior in 1884, to be used for "Indian purposes."112 The Que-
chan Tribe adopted a constitution and bylaws which became 
effective in 1936, and has exercised powers of self-government 
since that date. Article XI of the tribal bylaws states "the 
[Quechan Tribal] Council shall pass ordinances for the control of 
hunting and fishing upqn the reservation consistent with Federal 
laws and applicable game preservation practices."113 The council 
adopted various ordinances under Article XI requiring non-
Indians who hunt or fish on reservation lands to possess a tribal 
trespass permit, or be subject to arrest by tribal game wardens 
for criminal trespass."· Non-Indian trespassers are transferred 
to federal authorities to be prosecuted for unauthorized entry 
onto an Indian reservation for the purpose of hunting or fishing, 
which is a federal crime.1II 
As originally enacted, the tribal ordinances required non-
Indians to possess a valid California hunting or fishing license if 
engaging in those activities, and to observe state game laws 
110. [d. at 1154. 
111. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1974). See note 5 supra. 
112. Executive Order of January 9, 1884, reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 
832, cite'd in California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 424 F. Supp. 969, 970 (S.D. Cal. 
1977), vacated, 595 F.2d 1153. 
113. 424 F. Supp. at 971. 
114. [d. 
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1976) makes it a crime for anyone "without lawful authority 
or permission, willfully and knowingly [to go] upon any land that belongs to any Indian 
or Indian tribe, band, or group . . . for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing 
.. 
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while on the reservation. liB In 1975, however, the tribal council 
enacted Tribal Ordinance QT-1-75, which deleted the provisions 
requiring compliance with California game laws while on the 
reservation and established that a California license was not 
required of non-Indians if a tribal permit to hunt and fish on the 
reservation was obtained.1I7 Tribal game wardens, commissioned 
as Deputy Special Officers of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, were 
empowered to cite non-Indian trespassers, and procedures for the 
disposition of the charges were established. The tribe imposed 
neither hunting seasons nor limits on the quantity of fish or 
game that could be taken on the reservation by non-Indians. liS 
Prior to the adoption of Ordinance QT-1-75, the California 
Department of Fish and Game regularly sent game wardens onto 
the reservation lands to enforce state game laws ll9 on non-Indian 
hunting and fishing. In July, 1975, the tribal council informed 
the Department that the regulation of hunting and fishing on the 
reservation was the exclusive right of the council, and that non-
Indians would no longer be required to possess California game 
licenses. The council indicated that California game wardens 
attempting to enforce state game laws on the reservation would 
be arrested by tribal authorities for trespass. The state then 
sought a declaratory judgment of its authority to apply state 
game laws to non-Indians hunting or fishing on the reservation, 
and to have state game wardens enter the reservation to enforce 
the state regulations. 
The federal district court held that California game wardens 
could, in a prohibitory manner only,'20 apply state fish and game 
regulations to non-Indians hunting or fishing on reservation 
lands,l21 The court also found, however, that having failed to 
demonstrate a compelling interest, state game wardens were 
116. 424 F. Supp. at 971. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. 
119. License requirements are provided for at CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1050-1110 
(West Supp. 1979). Indian tribe members are generally exempt. CAL. FISH & GAME 
CODE § 12300 (West Supp. 1979). 
120. The phrase "prohibitory manner only'.' indicates that the state may, under the 
standards and conditions imposed by the court, prohibit through regulation certain on-
reservation acts by non-Indians which may be permitted by the tribe. The state may not, 
however, permit non-Indian on-reservation acts not allowed by the tribe, i.e., enforcing 
open seasons when the tribe chooses to observe a closed season. 424 F. Supp. at 975. 
121. [d. at 977. 
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prohibited from entering the reservation without the express 
permission of the Quechan Tribe.t22 Both sides appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit. 
B. NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
On appeal, California argued that the enforcement of state 
fish and game laws against non-Indians on the reservation did 
not infringe on the Quechan Tribe's right of self-government. 
California maintained that state regulation of non-Indian on-
reservation hunting and fishing was not preempted by federal 
statute or by specific tribal regulations. Thus, the state 
contended that it had . the right to enter the reservation to 
enforce state fish and game laws against non-Indians. '23 The 
Quechan Tribe, on the other hand, contended that the state's 
fish and game laws were preempted on the reservation by the 
tribe's regulations, and by the intent of Congress that the tribe, 
not the state, regulate on-reservation hunting and fishing. '24 The 
tribe argued that the case should be remanded to the district 
court for consideration of newly adopted tribal fish and game 
ordinances. In a decisive argument not presented to the district 
court, the tribe contended that sovereign immunity protected it 
from suit if California brought the action without the express 
consent of Congress. 
Since the tribe's claim of sovereign immunity represented a 
challenge to the court's jurisdiction, that question was considered 
first. The court noted that the application of sovereign immunity 
is not a discretionary remedy, but instead represents a right which 
courts must recognize. m The appellate courts compared tribal 
sovereign immunity to that of the United States, noting that 
"neither can be sued without the consent of Congress."128 The 
panel concluded that sovereign immunity barred this suit. 
The court rejected California's arguments that the facts were 
sufficiently unique for the court to refuse to apply the doctrine of 
122. [d. 
123. 595 F.2d at 1154. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. at 1155. 
126. [d. 
22
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sovereign immunity, and that Public Law 280127 represented an 
implied waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress. Even where 
Congress consents to a suit, the court observed, the abrogation of 
the immunity is limited by any conditions that Congress 
imposes.t 28 A waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress may not 
be implied, but must be "unequivocally expressed."129 The court 
found that the significance of a suit being initiated by a state 
rather than by a non-government plaintiff was transcended by the 
tribal right to immunity. Although sympathizing with the state's 
need to establish the extent of its authority, the court noted that 
"the desirability for complete settlement of all issues . . . must 
... yield to the principle of immunity,139 Finally, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the state's contention that unless Public Law 280 
were interpreted as a congressional waiver of the tribal sovereign 
immunity, the question of whether Public Law 280 provided the 
state authority to regulate non-Indian on-reservation hunting and 
fishing would be permanently precluded from judicial resolution. 
The panel found nothing in the language or legislative history of 
Public Law 280 indicating the intent of Congress to waive tribal 
sovereign immunity. The court observed that tribal immunity 
only bars judicial determination where suit is brought against only 
the tribe itself.t31 
Since the finding of sovereign immunity precluded con-
sideration of any other issues on appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated 
the district court judgment, and remanded the case to the lower 
court for dismissal. 132 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
In Quechan, the Ninth Circuit applied the traditional 
federal Indian law doctrine that as a quasi~sovereign entity, an 
Indian tribe possesses an immunity from suit similar to that of 
the United States. Although Congress may abrogate the tribal 
immunity and consent to a suit against a tribe, the abrogation is 
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1964). See note 5 supra. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. 
130. [d., quoting United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 
(1940). 
131. 595 F.2d at 1156. 
132. [d. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1165 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979), petition 
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3572 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1980) (No. 79·1128). 
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limited by any congressionally imposed conditions. The waiver 
of tribal sovereign immunity may not be implied, but must be 
unequivocally expressed. 
The finding by the Ninth Circuit that in considering 
sovereign immunity it is irrelevant that the action was initiated 
by a state government is significant to the continuing interaction 
of state and tribal governments. Equally important is the 
appellate court's recognition that sovereign immunity from suit 
is a right, not a discretionary remedy. The affirmation of this 
principle provides a valuable guarantee that an Indian tribe's 
economic resources will not be consumed in defending legal 
actions testing tribal rights, whether brought by individuals or 
by state governments. 
V. UNITED STATES V. JACKSON: TRIBAL REGULATION 
OF MEMBER ON-RESERVATION ACTIVITIES 
In United States v. Jackson l33 the Ninth Circuit considered 
the effect of an Indian tribe's failure to exercise a reserved right. 
The appellate court reviewed the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, 
and considered whether the failure to exercise a tribal right 
results in its termination, or permits its assumption by the 
United States, even in the absence of an express intent by 
Congress to do so. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The defendant, Donald Jackson, was an enrolled member of 
the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation. Being of 
less than one-fourth tribal blood, he was enrolled in a tribal 
membership classification which did not entitle him to 
participate in any rights arising out of tribal treaties, including 
hunting. Jackson was arrested for hunting on the reservation 
without tribal permission, and was prosecuted and convicted in 
federal district court under 18 U .S.C. section 1165,134 He did not 
deny hunting on the reservation without tribal permission, but 
appealed on the ground that article IVI35 of the tribal constitution, 
133. 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. July, 1979) (per Wright, J.; other panel members were 
Tang, J., and Palmieri, D.J.). 
134. For the relevant language of § 1165, see note 115 8upra. 
135. Article IV of the Tribe's constitution states: 
The membership of the Confederated Tribes shall consist, as 
follows, of: (a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear 
24
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which divides tribe members into three classifications, violated 
his right to equal protection under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968. 138 
B. NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first considered whether 18 
U.S.C. section 1165 provides federal courts with jurisdiction over 
acts committed by an Indian on an Indian reservation against 
the property of another Indian. Concluding that Congress did 
not intend the statute to be an exception to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of tribes over their members, the appellate court 
reversed the district court conviction without considering the 
defendant's equal protection claim. 137 
The Ninth Circuit panel observed that although Indian 
tribes have inherent sovereignty over internal affairs, it "is of a 
unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of 
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until 
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign 
powers."138 The power to enact and enforce tribal laws over tribe 
on the official census roll of the Confederated Tribes as of July 
1, 1949; provided that correctio~ may be made in said roll by 
the General Council within five (5) years from the adoption 
and approval of this Constitution and By·Laws, subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized rep· 
resentative. (b) All children born to enrollees of the Confeder-
ated Tribes, who are at least one-fourth (1;') degree of blood of 
the Confederated Tribes. Where only one parent of such chil-
dren is an enrollee of the Confederated Tribes, the children 
may become members only upon application accepted by the 
General Council. (c) Any other person of blood of the 
Confederated Tribes may, upon application, be admitted by a 
majority vote of the General Council to participate in tribal 
government and to vote and to hold office. It is expressly 
understood, however, that such persons shall not participate in 
any right or claim arising out of treaties to which the 
Confederated Tribes are a party. 
60(lF.2d 1283, 1284 n.1. 
136. Act of April 11, 1968,25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970). Also referred to as the Indian 
Bill of Rights, this statute was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Indian 
Civil Rights Act was intended to afford individual Indians protection from deprivation of 
their rights by Indian tribes. See Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil 
Rights' Act, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 557 (1972). The "due process" and "equal protection" clause 
of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8), has been controversial, and court interpretations have 
varied. See Note, Indian Law Overview, Ninth Circuit Survey, 7 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 
313, 313-21 (1976). 
137. 600 F.2d at 1285-86. 
138. Id. 
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members is part of the tribe's inherent sovereignty. While 
Congress placed certain serious offenses under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal courts when it enacted the Major 
Crimes Act,13' hunting on a reservation without a tribe's 
permission was not among the offenses included. The court 
observed that the Act, in extending "the general laws of the 
United States as to the punishment of offenses. . . to the Indian 
Country"140 contains exceptions, including one for "offenses 
committed by one Indian against the person or. property of 
another Indian."141 "[E]xcept for the offenses enumerated in 
[section 1153], all crimes committed by enrolled Indians against 
other Indians within Indian Country are subject to the jurisdiction 
of tribal courts."142 Under this interpretation, Jackson would be 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court for hunting 
on the reservation without tribal permission. Thus, the federal 
district court was without jurisdiction to hear the case. 143 
The United States argued that the language of section 1165 
appeared to apply to both Indians and non-Indians, therefore 
including Indians within the jurisdiction transferred from Indian 
tribes to the federal govemment. 144 To support this interpretation, 
the United States cited the statute which section 1165 replaced: 
[I]f any person, other than an Indian, shall, 
within the limits of any tribe with whom the 
United States shall have existing treaties, hunt, or 
trap, or take and destroy, any peltries or game, 
except for subsistence in the Indian Country, such 
person shall forfeit the sum of five hundred 
dollars, and forfeit all the traps, guns and 
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). The Major Crimes Act represented Congress' reaction to 
the Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), that federal courts 
had no jurisdiction over the on-reservation murder of an Indian by another Indian. See 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 363. The Major Crimes Act of 1885 gave the 
United States jurisdiction on Indian reservations for certain enumerated serious offenses. 
Offenses which are committed by one Indian against another Indian, and which are not 
listed in the Act are "subject to the jurisdiction of tribal courts." United States v. Ante-
lope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977). But see Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973), 
cited with explanation, 600 F.2d 1286 n.8. 
140. 600 F.2d at 1286. 
141. [d. 
142. [d., quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977). 
143. 600 F.2d at 1287, 1288. 
144. [d. at 1286. 
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ammunition in his possession, used or procured to 
be used for that purpose, and peltries so taken. 145 
341 
The United States argued that the deletion of the phrase 
"other than an Indian" from section 1165 reflected the intent of 
Congress to apply the section to Indians on reservations. I.e 
In rejecting this argument, the appellate court, relying on 
legislative history, noted that other changes included in section 
1165 indicated that Congress intended to include under federal 
jurisdiction only non-Indian hunting and fishing, which would 
not be subject to tribal jurisdiction or authority.147 
The United States, in an argument rejected by the court, 
maintained that in the absence of a tribal procedure to respond 
to hunting violations by Group C tribal members, like the 
defendant Jackson, the group came under federal jurisdiction, as 
did non-Indians who were outside the tribe's jurisdiction. u8 This 
contention "confuse [d] jurisdiction with enforcement 
procedures."uB The lack of an established system of punishment 
did not indicate the absence of power, but rather, showed merely 
that the tribe had failed to exercise the jurisdiction it held. 150 
Finding that the defendant's offense was within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and 
remanded the case to the lower court to be dismissed.151 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
In United States v. Jackson, the Ninth Circuit again reviewed 
the concept of limited tribal sovereignty. The importance of the 
case rests in the court's application of the principle of reserved 
rights and its refusal to allow federal jurisdiction to automatically 
fill a perceived vacuum. The court reaffirmed the Winans doctrine 
of reserved rightsl52 which states that, whether exercised or not, 
unless a tribal right is relinquished by the tribe, or extinguished by 
145. Ch. 161, § 8, 4 Stat. 730 (1834) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 216 (repealed 1960». 
146. 600 F.2d at 1287. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at 1288. 
150. [d. 
151. [d. 
152. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see text accompanying notes 27 & 
28 supra. 
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Congress, it continues. 
Tribes seeking to implement procedures for on-reservation 
autonomy and tribal self-determination will find the Ninth 
Circuit decision in this case noteworthy: a tribe's failure to 
exercise its jurisdictional power as a quasi-sovereign does not, in 
itself, result in the loss of that power, or its transfer to federal or 
state government. Those tribal rights and powers not relinquished 
by the tribe, or specifically terminated by Congress. are retained, 
and merely require exercise by the tribe to become effective. 
VI. UNITED STATES V. MONTANA: TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY - THE POWER TO EXCLUDE 
In United States u. Montana,153 the Ninth Circuit considered 
a direct conflict between a claim of inherent state sovereignty 
over territory within state boundaries, and federal and Indian 
tribal sovereignty over the same land. l54 The court noted that the 
issue was "close,"I55 and in reaching its decision reviewed the 
principles of treaty interpretation, federal preemption, tribal and 
state sovereignty and the effect of alienation of on-reservation 
land to non-tribal members. 
In an effort to reach an equitable resolution of the 
conflicting claims, the Ninth Circuit panel departed from strict 
principles of federal Indian law, noting in a postscript that its 
"holdings reflect a degree of precision not always present in the 
sources on which [the court] must rely."15B The court reached a 
compromise which is appealing in theory but unfortunate in its 
failure to maintain principles of interpretation necessary to 
153. 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979) (modified on denial of rehearing) (per curiam), 
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3572 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1980) (No. 79-1128). Sub-
sequent to the date of opinion, Montana petitioned for rehearing on the basis of the 
Supreme Court decision in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 99 S.Ct. 2529 (1979). The state 
argued that Wilson required the adoption of state law as a part of federal common law in 
determining the proper upper limit of the Big Hom bed and banks. See note 165 infra and 
accompanying text. In a per curiam opinion denying the petition for rehearing, the Ninth 
Circuit found that applying state law would frustrate the "federal policy and functions" 
and therefore declined to alter the original opinion. 604 F.2d 1173-74. As this issue is not 
directly related to the topic of this Note, textual discussion is omitted. 
154. [d. at 1164. 
155. [d. at 1166. 
156. [d. at 1172. 
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increase certainty in federal Indian law cases. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Crow Indian Reservation is a tract of land recognized in 
the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie157 as belonging to the Crow 
Tribe. A subsequent treaty with the Crow Indians in 1868158 
designated approximately eight million acres of land as a 
reservation for the tribe. In a series of Congressional acts, the 
size of the reservation was decreased, and today it consists of 
approximately two million acres. Passing through the reservation 
is the Big Horn River, a navigable waterway. While entering into 
the treaties with the Crow Tribe and establishing the Crow 
Reservation, the United States claimed title to the bed and 
banks of the Big Horn River as public lands. 15u Montana 
contended that jurisdiction over the river and the river banks 
passed to the state when Montana entered the Union. leo 
Both federal and state agencies were involved in developing 
fishing on the Big Horn River. In 1970, the Crow Tribe entered 
into an agreement with the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and 
Wildlife, a federal agency, to aid the tribe in developing and 
managing the reservation fishing resources, and to stock the 
waters of the Big Horn River and the Big Horn Canyon 
Recreation Area. In addition to this program, Montana had 
stocked the waters of the Crow Reservation with fish since 1928. 
The State Department of Fish and Game also conducted wildlife 
studies on the Big Horn River, with no objection from the Crow 
Tribe or from the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
In 1973, the Crow Tribal Council enacted Tribal Resolution 
74-05 181 which prohibited anyone other than a member of the 
157. Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749 (1852) (hereinafter Treaty of 1851). 
158. Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat. 649 (1868). 
159. United States v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599, 601 (D. Mont. 1978). 
160. [d. 
161. Crow Tribal Council Resolution 74-05 states in part: 
Be it ordained by the Crow Tribe, meeting in a duly held and 
noticed council that hunting, fishing and trespassing within 
the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation is 
hereby prohibited and the proper officials of the United States 
and the Crow Tribe of Indians are hereby directed and author· 
ized to enforce the provisions of this ordinance and any federal 
statute which would prohibit such hunting and fishing and 
trespassing, provided, however, that the provisions of this ordi· 
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Crow Tribe from hunting or fishing on the reservation. Montana 
continued to authorize on-reservation hunting and fishing by 
non-Indians after the closing of the reservation to these 
activities, and to issue licenses to non-members of the Crow 
Tribe. The Crow Tribe, joined by the United States, brought an 
action in federal district court seeking a declaration that title to 
the bed and banks of the Big Horn River within the Crow 
Reservation was held by the United States in trust for the Crow 
Tribe. lez The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the Crow 
Tribe had the power to prohibit non-members of the tribe from 
hunting or fishing on the reservation, and that the state had no 
authority to regulate hunting or fishing by non-Indians on the 
Indian land. ISS 
The district court exhaustively reviewed the history of the 
Crow Tribe and the legislative history of the Congressional acts 
affecting the reservation. The lower court held that Montana 
possessed title to the bed and banks of the river, and had the 
power and authority to regulate on-reservation hunting and 
fishing by non-Indians, including the application of state fish 
and game laws to these individuals. Ie. The Crow Tribe, again 
joined by the United States, appealed the lower court findings to 
the Ninth Circuit. 
B. NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
The Ninth Circuit considered the issues raised in the district 
court, and the additional issue of whether the Crow Tribe could 
regulate or prohibit on-reservation hunting and fishing activities 
by non-Indians who possess fee patent land within the 
reservation boundaries. In reaching its four-part holding, the 
appellate court observed that title claims to the bed and banks 
of the Big Horn River had already been settled in the Ninth 
Circuit when they found that the bed and banks of the Big Horn 
nance shall not apply to the members of the Crow Tribe of 
Indians. 
Be it further resolved, that the Crow Tribal officials in-
form the State Fish and Game Department for the State of 
Montana and Bureau of Indian Affairs (United States Depart-
ment of Interior) that hunting and fishing on the Crow Reser-
vation is hereby closed. 
604 F.2d at 1164 n.4. 
162. 457 F. Supp. 599, 600 (D. Mont. 1978). 
163. 1d. 
164. 1d. at 611. 
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River up to the ordinary high water mark was held by the United 
States in trust for the Crow Tribe. 185 
Considering the validity of Crow Tribal Regulation 74-05, 
which closed the reservation to non-Indian hunting and fishing, 
the court found that the treaties of 1851 and 1868 empowered the 
tribe to exclude non-members from the reservation lands for any 
purpose.188 In support of this interpretation, the court cited a 
previous Ninth Circuit decision holding that "the right of 
Indians to control hunting, trapping and fishing on their lands is 
a prerogative of ownership which the United States recognizes as 
a matter of federallaw."187 Although affirming its earlier holding, 
the court observed in a footnote to the Montana decision that to 
the extent that any Crow Tribal Resolution was in conflict with 
the Supreme Court rejection in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe l88 
of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-indians, the Crow Tribal 
Resolution was invalid. 188 
The Ninth Circuit next considered the question of tribal 
power to prohibit on-reservation hunting and fishing by non-
members of the Crow Tribe who owned fee patent lands on the 
reservation, an issue not raised in the district court. The Crow 
Tribe purported to exclude all non-tribe members from on-
reservation hunting and fishing. Noting that the 1887 General 
Allotment Act and the Crow Allotment Act of 1920 provided that 
lands within the reservation could be sold to non-Indians as fee 
patent grants, the court stated' that "it defies reason to suppose 
that Congress intended that non-members who reside on fee 
165. 604 F.2d 1162, 1166, citing United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 831 (9th 
Cir: 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977):The Montana court distinguished 
its earlier decision in California v. Quechan Tribe ofIndians, 595 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1979), 
see section IV supra, noting that because the Crow Tribe itself brought suit, sovereign 
immunity did not apply. 604 F.2d at 1165 n.5. 
166. [d. at 1169. 
167. [d. at 1167, quoting United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 834 (9th Cir. 1976), 
rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977). The Ninth Circuit noted that "[a]lthough 
the Supreme Court vacated our decision on double jeopardy grounds, ... our analysis of 
the title issue was in no way questioned." United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d at 1166 
n.6. 
168. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
169. 604 F.2d at 1167 n.7. Crow Tribal Resolution 75-17b purported to grant criminal 
jurisdiction to the Crow Tribe over non-Indians committing offenses on the reservation. 
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court held that "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty 
of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-
Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress." 435 
U.S. 191, 210. 
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patent lands could hunt and fish thereon only by consent of the 
tribe."170 Although finding that neither of the allotment acts 
explicitly qualified the tribe's rights to regulate hunting and 
fishing, and acknowledging that treaty right alteration is not to 
be lightly imputed to Congress,171 the court nevertheless found 
that the exclusion of non-tribe members who resided on fee 
patent land on the reservation exceeded the powers of the Crow 
Tribe authorized by the treaties and by Congressional act.172 The 
court, therefore, held that Crow Tribal Regulation 74-05 was 
invalid only insofar as it applied to hunting and fishing by non-
tribal members who residel'on their own fee patent land. 173 Non-
member fee patent land owners who did not reside on the land 
could be excluded from hunting and fishing on their own land by 
the tribe. The tribal exclusion from these activities on other 
parts of the reservation was not affected. 
This limited modification of a treaty right resulted from the 
court's recognition that those who live on the land in the West 
"are likely to regard hunting and fishing thereon to be as natural 
and ordinary as working, sleeping and eating" but that those 
who do not live on the land are "somewhat less inclined" to the 
activities. 174 Non-resident fee patent land owners were therefore 
not exempt from the prohibition contained in Tribal Regulation. 
74-05. Supporting its finding, the court reasoned: "[W]e must 
. . . live together, a process not enhanced by unbending 
insistence on supposed legal rights which if found to exist may 
well yield tainted gains helpful neither to Indians nor non-
Indians."175 
The court next considered the respective powers of the Crow 
Tribe and Montana to regulate on-reservation hunting and 
fishing by non-members of the Crow Tribe. The court noted that 
the private landowner has the power to exclude others from 
hunting and fishing on that land, and observed that the Crow 
Tribe is more than a mere owner, possessing "attributes of 
sovereignty over both [its] members and their territory."178 The 
170. 604 F.2d at 1168. 
171. Id., citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 
(1968). 
172. 604 F.2d at 1167. 
173. Id. at 1169. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1170. 
176. Id., quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). The Montana 
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court also observed that this sovereignty is limited, and "exists 
only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete 
defeasance."177 An earlier Ninth Circuit decision, where an 
Indian tribe sought to prevent local law enforcement officers 
from entering a reservation, the tribe was found to have the 
power to 
exercise several types of authority over non-
members who enter the reservation to hunt or 
fish. These are the rights to determine who may 
enter the reservation; to define the conditions 
upon which they may enter; to prescribe rules of 
conduct; to expel those who enter the reservation 
without proper authority or those who violate 
tribal, state or federal laws; to refer those who 
violate state or federal laws to state or federal 
officials; and to designate officials responsible for 
effectuating the foregoing. 17s 
The tribe could not, however, assert criminal jurisdiction over 
non-member tribal law violators, or confiscate a non-member's 
property as a consequence of a tribal law violation. 
In an earlier Ninth Circuit case, the court accepted the 
. finding of the Montana Supreme Court that the state could 
enforce its game laws on non-tribal members from on-reservation 
hunting and fishing unless precluded by an act of Congress, or 
unless it would interfere with the efforts of the tribe to affect 
self-government on the reservation. 17t The conservation of 
wildlife resources and the improvement of fish and game 
required the cooperation of the federal government, the Crow 
Tribe and the state. On the basis of this necessary cooperation, 
the court held that the Crow Tribe may, to the degree that non-
member on-reservation hunting and fishing is permitted by the 
tribe, set seasons and limits for fish and game, as the tribe feels 
appropriate.'so The tribe could not, however, subject non-
members to the criminal processes of tribal courts. The tribe 
could impose fees on non-members for the privilege of hunting or 
panel cited its earlier decision in Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation 
v. Washington, 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979), noting that dual regulation of hunting and 
fishing on Indian reservations is not unknown. 604 F.2d at 1171. 
177. Id. 
178. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976). 
179. United States v. Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976), affirming State v. Dan-
ielson, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689, 692-93 (1967). 
ISO. 604 F.2d at 1171. 
33
Fox: Indian Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
348 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:315 
fishing on reservation lands, or completely exclude them, but 
could not confiscate the property of non-Indians found in 
violation of tribal or other laws. 181 Montana could regulate the 
non-tribal member on-reservation hunting and fishing in a 
prohibitory manner only,.82 and could apply relevant state fish 
and game laws to the extent that they were at least as restrictive 
as tribal regulations. Having reversed the holding of the district 
court, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court 
to enter judgment in keeping with the appellate court's 
holdings. 183 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
In United States v. Montana, the Ninth Circuit panel was 
confronted with a direct conflict between the inherent right of 
the Crow Tribe to exclude non-tribal members from hunting and 
fishing on its reservation, and the right of non-tribal member 
resident owners of on-reservation fee patent lands to hunt and 
fish on their own land. The court sought an equitable com-
promise between the conflicting rights. It therefore limited the 
tribe's power to exclude, but only in regard to the nonmem-
ber reservation land owners, and only on their own land. The 
tribe's right to exclude others from the reservation was affirm-
ed. 
The court analyzed the original treaties in the context of 
subsequent Congressional acts, concluding that, though not 
expressly stated, Congress intended to limit the right of the 
Crow Tribe to exclude by sanctioning the sale of reservation 
lands to non-tribal members. The Ninth Circuit panel failed to 
apply the federal Indian law principle that Indian treaty rights 
may be modified or abrogated only when Congress has expressly 
indicated the intent to do so. At this time of rapid development 
in Indian law, well delineated principles of law are needed to 
standardize the adjudication of similar issues, and to increase 
the predictability of their resolution. The court's application of 
the express abrogation doctrine l84 might have resulted in the 
finding that in the absence of an express statement modifying 
tribal rights in subsequent Congressional acts, the tribe could 
181. [d. 
182. See note 120 supra. 
183. 604 F.2d at 1172-73. 
184. See notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text. 
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exercise its reserved right to exclude even fee patent land 
residents from hunting or fishing on their own land. Recognizing 
hunting and fishing as property rights,IS5 the court might then 
have required compensation be paid to the landowners by the 
Crow Tribe if their rights were abrogated. 
In support of its decision, the court stated: "We [Indians 
and non-Indians] must, however, live together, a process not 
el}hanced by an unbending insistence on supposed legal rights 
which if found to exist may well yield tainted gains helpful 
neither to Indians nor to non-Indians."ls8 This statement, 
although eloquent in its intent to reflect equity and justice, and 
appealing in its reason, also represents the continuation of the 
practice of interpreting treaties on the basis of implication, often 
using current standards, rather than by. the application of 
standardized rules of interpretation. The Ninth Circuit appeared 
aware of the potential threat this practice poses, adding a 
postscript which indicated the limited nature of its modification 
of the tribal right, and reflected frustration at having to resolve 
issues left unclear by Congress. IS7 The court's decision is in 
accord with its finding in Kimball III88 that the alienation of 
former reservation lands to non-Indians results in the alteration 
of treaty rights from exclusive to non-exclusive on those lands; 
the Montana panel appropriately construed its holding nar-
rowly,1su The efforts of the Ninth Circuit to clarify and limit its 
holding may indicate that the court recognized the direct con-flict 
of rights requiring a compromise between strict law and 
equity, rather than that the court rejected use of objective 
standards of construction in federal Indian law. The question 
whether the Ninth Circuit will adopt the requirement that treaty 
rights may only be altered by an express statement by Congress, 
as a strict standard, will have to await a case without rights 
conflicting. 
185. Hunting and fishing rights are property within the meaning of the fifth amend· 
ment, and must be compensated for if limited or abrogated. See Menominee Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 388 F.2d 998 (Ct. CI. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Hynes v. 
Grimes Packing Co., 377 U.S. 86, 105 (1949). 
186. 604 F.2d at 1169. 
187. [d. at 1172. 
188. 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979); see discussion at III supra. 
189. "When cessions are made or rights are extinguished they are to be construed 
narrowly as affecting only matters specifically mentioned." FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra 
note 5, at xxi. 
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VII. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COL VILLE 
INDIAN RESERVATION V. WASHINGTON: 
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY V. FEDERAL PRE-
EMPTION DOCTRINE 
In Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. 
Washington Ito (Confederated Tribes), the Ninth Circuit, in a 
decision marked by a dissent, again considered the power of a 
state to enforce its fish and game laws on non-Indians engaged in 
on-reservation hunting and fishing. A majority of the panel 
members applied federal preemption doctrine rather than 
principles of Indian tribal sovereignty. Its analysis focused on 
whether state on-reservation fish and game regulation of non-
Indians had been expressly preempted by Congress or the 
Confederated Tribes, or whether the state's action would 
represent an obstacle to federal policy. The dissent also applied 
federal preemption principles but reached a contrary decision. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Colville Indian Reservation in eastern Washington was 
established by Executive Order in 1872.ltl The Colville Tribes 
enacted a constitution and bylaws in 1938, providing a fourteen-
member business council as the tribes' governing body. The 
tribes owned a resort located on the reservation, and encouraged 
tourism and non-Indian sport fishing on the reservation. The 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service aided in keeping 
reservation waters stocked with fish. The tribes enacted 
ordinances requiring that non-Indians entering the reservation to 
fish purchase a tribal fishing license, but not requiring a 
Washington state license. 
In 1975, Washington game enforcement officers entered the 
Colville Reservation and issued citations to non-Indians found 
fishing without state licenses. Tribal police officers contested the 
state's authority to issue citations on the reservation, and the 
state officers departed. The tribes brought an action seeking a 
declaratory judgment that Washington had no authority to 
regulate any fishing on the reservation, and a permanent 
injunction against state regulation on the reservation. 
190. 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Choy, J.; Duniway, J., dissenting; the 
other panel member was Grant, D.J.): 
191. Executive Order of July 2, 1872 reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 916. 
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The district court opinion cited Supreme Court dicta that 
"the trend had been away from the idea of inherent Indian 
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on 
federal preemption."lt2 The court also noted that Indian hunting 
and fishing rights are implied in agreements establishing 
reservations, and that these rights are exclusive on reservation 
lands unless clearly relinquished by the tribes. Being inherent 
and not granted, these rights are presumed reserved, unless 
relinquished, whether the reservation was created by treaty or by 
executive order. The district court found that the United States 
had preempted state regulation of fishing on the Colville 
Reservation by assuming that jurisdiction when the reservation 
was formed, and had delegated that power to the Colville Tribes. 
Therefore, it held that the state's power to "regulate or control 
fishing by Indians or non-Indians on the Colville Reservation"IU3 
was preempted, and the state lacked jurisdiction. Washington 
appealed, and the case came before the Ninth Circuit. 
B. NINTH CIRcurr's MAJORITY OPINION 
The appellate court, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the decision 
of the district court, and held that the state was not precluded 
from requiring non-Indians to purchase state licenses to fish on 
the Colville Reservation, or from imposing state regulations 
equal to or more restrictive than those applied by the tribes to 
Indians and non-Indians fishing on the reservation. lU4 The 
majority noted that the district court had stated the applicable 
rule of federal preemption, and appropriately interpreted the 
effect of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution; 
however, the majority disagreed with the lower court's 
conclusion that tribal regulations preempted state regulation. 195 
The Supreme Court had stated that the purpose of the 
supremacy clause is to invalidate those state laws which stand 
"as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress,IUB and that "[e]nactments of 
the federal government passed to protect and guard its Indian 
wards only affect the operation. . . of such state laws as conflict 
192. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 412 F. 
Supp. 651, 654 (E.D. Wash. 1976) rev'd, 591 F.2d 89, quoting McClanahan v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). 
193. 412 F. Supp. at 656. 
194. 591 F.2d at 92. 
195. [d. at 91. 
196. 591 F.2d at 91, ~iting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
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with the federal enactments."IU7 The appellate court further 
noted the Supreme Court finding that: 
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it 
should manifest its intention clearly. It will not be 
presumed that a federal statute was intended to 
supersede the exercise of the power of the state 
unless there is a clear manifestation of intention 
to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not 
lightly to be presumed. IDS 
Having reviewed federal preemption doctrine, the court 
considered whether state fish and game regulation on the 
Colville Reservation had been preempted. The majority found 
that the tribes had conceded state jurisdiction would not 
represent an obstacle to their program of developing and 
regulating on-reservation fishing, citing a provision of the 
Colville Tribal Hunting and Fishing Code, which stated "where 
tribal ll!w is more restrictive than state law the tribal law shall 
prevail."IDD This provision was interpreted as an effort by the 
tribes to aid and support state law game enforcement, rather 
than as an indication that state law should never apply. The 
court found support in tribal council resolutions that limited the 
scope of tribal permits to the state's definition of fishable waters, 
and that provided the tribal "[flishing season shall be identical 
to the Washington State Fishing Season."200 The court took note 
that the resolutions regarding tribal fishing permits stated that 
"[t]he permittee must have appropriate. State of Washington 
Hunting and Fishing license and must comply with State seasons, 
species and limitations as required by State law. "201 The 
court concluded that the program developed by the tribal 
council allowed for dual state-federal jurisdiction, and did not 
indicate the intent to preempt state action. 
The majority saw the issues as narrow ones, since 
Washington, in keeping with Quechan Tribe of Indians u. 
Rowe,202 had conceded that tribal members were free of state 
regulation on the reservation, and that the tribes could either 
197. 591 F.2d at 91, citing Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976). 
198: 591 F.2d at 91, citing New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 
413 (1973). 
199. 591 F.2d at 91. 
200. [d. 
201. [d. at 92. 
202. 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976). 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/12
1980] INDIAN LAW 353 
charge a fee for non-Indian fishing, or close the reservation lands 
to non-Indians completely. The state sought only the authority 
to apply state licensing requirements to non-Indians fishing on 
the reservation, claiming only the authority to apply prohibitory 
regulations, not to authorize activity prohibited by tribal 
regulations. The majority concluded that no clear manifestation 
of Congressional or tribal intent to preempt regulation by 
Washington was present, and that there had been no showing 
that state regulation presel)ted an obstacle to achieving any 
federal policy. The court observed: "[W]e need not decide now 
whether tribal efforts if made to preempt the State would be 
consistent with Congressional intent, or whether such efforts, if 
consistent with congressional goals, would preempt state 
regulation."203 The Ninth Circuit, having rejected the findings of 
the district court, reversed the lower court judgment. 
C. THE DISSENT 
The dissent would have affirmed the lower court finding 
that the enactment by the Colville Tribes of a comprehensive 
program for administering on-reservation fishing preempted 
state regulation. Contending that there was no requirement for 
express premption in law, the dissent concluded that the tribes' 
resolutions made the intent to preempt state on-reservation 
regulation of non-Indian fishing sufficiently clear. The evidence 
cited by the majority supported a clear manifestation of the 
tribes' efforts to adopt their own regulations and to preempt 
the state. The dissent suggested that tribal adoption of the 
state fishing season was "merely a convenient shorthand. "204 
Similarly, the wording of the tribal permit, indicating that the 
permittee must also possess a state hunting or fishing license, 
could as readily have been interpreted as a warning of what the 
"state says it requires"206 as the majority's finding, that it 
represented a recognition by the tribe that the state was entitled 
to require it. Finally, the dissent observed that hunting and 
fishing have historically been the basis of Indian survival, and 
argued that these rights have always been within the powers of 
Indian tribes to regulate. Concluding that the exercise of 
enforcement powers by the Colville Tribes preempted the power 
of Washington to regulate on-reservation hunting and fishing by 
203. 591 F.2d at 92. 
204. [d. at 93 (Duniway, J., dissenting). 
205. [d. at 94. 
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non-tribal members, the dissent indicated that the district court 
decision should have been affirmed. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Ninth Circuit's application of federal preemption 
principles as the primary determinant of the issue of state 
jurisdiction in regulating non-Indian on-reservation hunting and 
fishing represents a serious threat to the efforts of Indian tribes 
to institute self-government. As applied by the majority in 
Confederated Tribes, federal preemption doctrine, originally 
used in federal Indian law to protect Indian tribes from state 
encroachment and taxation of Indian property, appears to 
replace the Winans206 doctrine of reserved rights. The Winans 
doctrine, by which tribal rights continue unless expressly 
abrogated by Congress, is in direct contrast to this theory of the 
preemption doctrine, which affords states the opportunity to 
assume tribal powers unless the tribe or Congress expressly and 
clearly manifests the intent to preempt the state action. This 
subtle shift in the burden of manifesting a clear and express 
intent represents a rejection of the federal Indian law principle 
that Indian tribal rights are not grants from the United States, 
but powers which derive from an original sovereignty and are 
reserved unless expressly abrogated by Congress. 
Most harmful is the implication that an Indian tribe is a 
mere federal instrumentality.207 This interpretation, rather than 
representing a shield from state taxation of federal entities, 
subjects Indian tribes to the restraints placed on federal agencies 
to prevent federal usurpation of those powers reserved to the 
states. In contrasting states' rights with Indian tribal rights, and 
defining an Indian tribe as a federal instrumentality, the Ninth 
Circuit establishes the supremacy of the states except in those . 
areas where the state is expressly preempted by the Consti-
tution, or by an act of Congress. Although implying in this case 
that a clearly expressed intent by an Indian tribe to preempt 
the action of a state could be adjudged adequate to receive 
judicial support, it appears that the Ninth Circuit will inter-
206. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see text accompanying notes 27 
& 28 supra. 
207. See generally Kissel, The Ninth Circuit's Federal Instrumentality Doctrine-A 
Threat to Tribal Sovereignty, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 358 (1978). 
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pret all but the most strident indications of intent as insuffi-
cient. 
The application of federal Indian law principles to the issues 
raised in this case would require a holding contrary to the Ninth 
Circuit's. In the absence of an express abrogation of a tribal right 
by Congress, or the express delegation of jurisdiction to a state, 
neither of which occurred in this case, the regulation of on-
reservation fishing by both Indians and non-Indians should be 
reserved to the tribes. 
The application of federal preemption requirements, and the 
apparent extension of the federal instrumentality doctrine to 
jurisdiction issues between an Indian tribe and a state may 
represent the most serious threat to Indian rights since the 
federal termination policy. It is of particular concern that the 
threat emanates from the judiciary, which has traditionally 
emanates represented the single source of protection for Indian 
tribal rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court first considered a conflict 
arising from the effort of a state to enforce its game laws on an 
Indian exercising a claimed treaty right to hunt in 1896.208 Since 
that date, tribes and individual Indians have repeatedly turned 
to the federal courts for protection of their traditional hunting 
and fishing rights. This repeated return to the courts, expending 
personal and often limited tribal resources, reflects Indian 
determination to maintain rights often viewed as basic to their 
culture. Tribes seeking to augment tribal income by developing 
on-reservation wildlife resources are increasingly confronted by 
state attempts to share in the proceeds derived from hunting and 
fishing, or state efforts to enforce its regulations to conserve a 
resource endangered by over-exploitation. 
The issues confronting the courts are complex. No law of 
general application defines or governs the hunting and fishing 
rights of all Indians. Treaties and agreements made with various 
tribes over a period of two centuries differ in significant detail 
and reflect the often conflicting policies of the United States, 
which have fluctuated between the forced assimilation of Indians 
208. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). 
41
Fox: Indian Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
356 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:315 
and the protection of their rights and culture. Promises made to 
Indian tribes in return for the cession of tribal land sometimes 
reflect the naivete or avarice of the negotiators, while the often 
unpopular decisions of the courts indicate the difficulty of 
constructing an equitable interpretation of early treaties or 
agreements in modern terms. 
The competition for a limited resource has resulted in 
conflicts so severe that they are often reflected by confrontations 
outside of the courtroom. From the Hoopa Reservation of 
California and the Puyallup Reservation of Washington, to the 
Cherokee Reservation of North Carolina, Indians and non-
Indians have attempted to resolve the issues in increasingly 
violent interactions. In the Northwest, the conflict over Indian 
treaty fishing rights has resulted in what has been termed the 
most significant challenge to federal authority and supremacy by 
a state since the Civil War.zoe 
The absence of an adequately developed body of Indian law 
further confounds judicial efforts to resolve the issues. The 
variations in initial federal dealings with Indian tribes and the 
absence of consistently applied general principles of interpre-
tation result in an uncertainty which requires the repeated 
judicial hearing of similar issues. 
During the last term, the Ninth Circuit considered Indian 
hunting and fishing rights in five cases reviewed in this article. 
In three of the cases,210 the court of appeals applied traditional 
principles of federal Indian law in considering the issues and 
reached findings consonant with the development of pre-
dictability in Indian law. In the fourth case,211 however, the 
court found justification for failing to adopt a standard which 
lessens the danger of inconsistent interpretation of similar issues 
209. Cf. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 
1126, (9th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 99 S. Ct. 3055 (1979) (In this Indian 
fishing rights decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that "except for some desegregation cases 
... the district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frus-
trate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century."). See also Petty, Accomoda-
tion of Indian Treaty Rights in an International Fishery: An International Problem Beg-
ging for an International Solution, 54 WASH. L. REv. 403 n.3 (1979). 
210. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768; California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 
F.2d 1153; United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283. 
211. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162. 
42
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/12
1980] INDIAN LAW 357 
by different courts. In the fifth case,212 the Ninth Circuit 
continued a trend away from established federal Indian law, 
applying instead the doctrine of federal peemption as the 
primary determinant of an Indian tribe and state conflict. The 
expansion of this theory of interpretation with the corollary use 
of federal instrumentality doctrine represents a significant threat 
to the concept of tribal sovereignty and the efforts of Indian 
tribes to preserve on-reservation autonomy and self-government. 
Ben E. Fox 
212. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591 F.2d 
89. 
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